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Abstract: In the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is 
revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as 
intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there 
is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and 
what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this paper provides a 
detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, as well as its incompatibility with 
physicalism, is to be understood. 
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1. Introduction 
The term “revelation,” introduced by Mark Johnston (1992), is used in the debate about 
the metaphysics of color properties to refer to the view that the whole nature of color 
properties is given in color experience. This paper is not concerned with the thesis of 
revelation in the philosophy of color, but with a parallel idea that also goes by the name 
“revelation” in the philosophy of mind. This is the claim that the whole nature of qualia 
(phenomenal properties) is given in phenomenal experience. 
 
This latter thesis of revelation is by no means unfamiliar to philosophers of mind, 
although the name “revelation” has not always been used to identify it. Discussions on 
the idea of revelation can be traced to Descartes (1985: 215-7) in his writings on the 
notion of a clear and distinct idea, and Hume (2000: 136) in the Treatise.1 One can also 
find contemporary discussions on revelation in relation to the topic of phenomenal 
experience and the physicalist-dualist debate about the nature of consciousness (Strawson, 
1989; Lewis, 1995; Nida-Rümelin, 2007; Stoljar, 2006, 2009; Damnjanovic, 2012; Goff, 
2015, 2017; Majeed, 2017; Trogdon, 2017).  
 
 Two things are worth noting regarding the contemporary literature on revelation. First, 
revelation is often thought of as being in tension with physicalism. For instance, Lewis 
(1995) takes revelation to be incompatible with physicalism. More recently, Philip Goff 
(2015, 2017) has appealed to the thesis of revelation to argue against physicalism. Of 
course, whether there is an incompatibility between revelation and physicalism, and how 
this incompatibility is to be understood provided that there is one, depends on how we 
cash out revelation and physicalism (see Damnjanovic, 2012; Trogdon, 2017; Stoljar, 
2018).  
 
The second thing worth noting about the contemporary literature on revelation is that 
revelation is often thought of as an intuitive claim. Among those who think this way about 
revelation are physicalists who also acknowledge the incompatibility between revelation 
and physicalism (Lewis, 1995: 142; McLaughlin, 2003: 378; Braddon-Mitchell, 2007: 
287; Hill, 2014: 199-200). For instance, Lewis (1995) and Braddon-Mitchell (2007) take 
revelation to be intuitive because they think that it is part of the ordinary conception of 
experience. Despite thinking that it has an intuitive appeal, these physicalists nevertheless 
deny the thesis of revelation in order to safeguard physicalism. 
 
Of course, the aforementioned claims about revelation, namely, that it serves as a crucial 
premise in an argument against physicalism and that it is intuitive, are points of contention 
in the literature. Regarding the former, one might dispute the force of the argument from 
revelation against physicalism. For instance, one might query whether the argument 
proves that all versions of physicalism are false; one might also argue that revelation is 
in fact implausible (see Damnjanovic, 2012; Trogdon, 2017; Stoljar, 2018). With respect 
to the intuitiveness of revelation, one might question whether revelation is in fact intuitive 
or part of the ordinary conception of experience as is often claimed (see Stoljar, 2009).  
 
In order to gain a better understanding of these debates about revelation we need, first 
and foremost, to clarify the idea of revelation itself. While there are frequent mentions of 
revelation in the philosophy of mind, as we have just seen, there is room for further 
discussion of what the thesis of revelation precisely amounts to. The starting point of the 
thesis is the claim that by having a phenomenal experience, one is in a position to 
introspect that experience and to form certain thoughts – make certain judgements, 
achieve certain knowledge – which are “revelatory” about the experience. The sense in 
 which such thoughts are “revelatory” requires careful articulation. According to Lewis 
(1995), the kind of thought about phenomenal experience under consideration amounts 
to knowing the essence of the qualia of a given experience. A main goal of this paper is 
to look into Lewis’ remarks in detail and clarify what these revelatory introspective 
thoughts about phenomenal experience are supposed to be. 
 
According to the formulation presented in this paper, revelation is a thesis about qualia, 
which are the phenomenal properties of our experience. The thesis claims that by having 
an experience-token with a particular quale Q, one is in a position to form a certain 
thought or know a certain truth, namely, “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” captures the 
essence of Q, although it may be hard to put into words. Having clearly articulated the 
thesis of revelation, I turn to explain how the thesis of revelation thus understood is 
incompatible with versions of physicalism. Overall, this paper aims to make important 
clarifications that shed light on existing debates regarding revelation. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I examine the thesis of revelation as 
presented in Lewis’ 1995 paper “Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?.” Lewis’ paper 
is particularly important to the literature on revelation because ideas in this paper have 
given rise to much discussion on the topic (see Stoljar, 2006, 2009; Majeed, 2017). 
Section 3 goes beyond Lewis’ remarks on revelation and puts forward a more precise 
formulation of the thesis of revelation. Sections 4 and 5 make two further clarifications 
regarding the thesis. In section 4, I make clear that the thesis of revelation involves a 
knowledge-attribution de dicto regarding knowledge de dicto that a particular quale Q is 
X, where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q. In section 5, I clarify how the thesis 
of revelation might plausibly entail the claim that qualia are simple. Section 6 explains 
how revelation thus understood is incompatible with certain versions of physicalism. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Lewis on Revelation 
In his article “Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?” Lewis discusses the thesis of 
revelation, which he calls “the Identification Thesis.” Lewis’ account of revelation is 
framed in terms of the notion of qualia. The term “qualia” in this context refers to the 
phenomenal character or the what-it-is-likeness of our experience. Qualia are phenomenal 
properties of particular events of experiencing. Different types of phenomenal experience 
 are individuated by their qualia. Token experiences with the same qualia belong to the 
same type of experience.2 
 
Although “quale” and its plural, “qualia,” are technical terms, the concept, as Lewis sees 
it, is nevertheless part of our folk psychology. As a functionalist, he (1995: 140) regards 
the term “qualia” as “a name for the occupants of a certain functional role that is spelled 
out in our tacitly known folk psychology.” According to Lewis, the folk-psychological 
role of qualia includes at least the following four theses: 
 
(i) Qualia cause our “abilities to recognize and to imagine experiences of the 
same type” (Lewis, ibid.: 141); 
(ii) Qualia are “responsible for responses of pleasure, disgust, etc.” (op. cit.); 
(iii) Qualia are “responsible for judgements of similarity-distance, e.g., the 
judgement that these two colour-samples nearly match whereas those two 
contrast strikingly” (op. cit.); and, 
(iv) “We identify the qualia of our experiences.” (op. cit.) 
 
While the first three components of the qualia-role are clear, the fourth one requires 
elaboration, especially with respect to the notion of identification. Lewis elaborates on 
this component of the qualia-role: 
 
Folk psychology says, I think, that we identify the qualia of our experiences. We know exactly what 
they are – and that in an uncommonly demanding and literal sense of ‘knowing what’. If I have an 
experience with quale Q, I know that I am having an experience with quale Q, and I will afterwards 
remember (unless I happen to forget) that on that occasion I had an experience with quale Q. It is by 
producing this identifying knowledge that a novel experience confers abilities to recognize and 
imagine. (op. cit.) 
 
Consider the experience of tasting the Australian spread Vegemite. In having such an 
experience, one might have various thoughts about the experience and come to know 
numerous things about it, e.g. “This experience is interesting,” “I have had this experience 
before,” “It is similar to the experience of tasting the British spread Marmite,” etc. Among 
these thoughts is, Lewis would say, the following one: “I (now) know exactly what the 
phenomenal character of the experience of tasting Vegemite is.” This latter knowledge is 
an instance of what Lewis (op. cit.) calls “the Identification Thesis” – “We know exactly 
 what [qualia] are.” According to Lewis’ understanding of folk psychology, knowing 
exactly what the quale of the experience is confers one’s abilities to remember, recognize 
and imagine experiences of the same type. 
 
But what does Lewis mean when he says that “we know exactly what [qualia] are”? Lewis 
clarifies: 
 
I spoke of ‘an uncommonly demanding and literal sense of “knowing what”’. Let me elaborate. I 
say that according to the Identification Thesis, the knowledge I gain by having an experience with 
quale Q enables me to know what Q is – identifies Q – in this sense: any possibility not ruled out by 
the content of my knowledge is one in which it is Q, and not any other property instead, that is the 
quale of my experience. Equivalently, when I have an experience with quale Q, the knowledge I 
thereby gain reveals the essence of Q: a property of Q such that, necessarily, Q has it and nothing 
else does. (Lewis, ibid.: 142) 
 
According to Lewis, by having an experience with a particular quale, we are in a position 
to know exactly what that quale is in the sense that we are in a position to know the 
essence of the quale. This is what Lewis calls “an uncommonly demanding and literal 
sense of ‘knowing what’.” This demanding sense of “knowing what a quale is” contrasts 
with a less demanding sense of “knowing what” (Lewis, ibid.: 143). In everyday contexts, 
we can say that one knows what something is even if one does not know the essence of 
that thing. One knows what water is in an everyday non-scientific context insofar as one 
knows a cluster of descriptions about water, and knows how to identify ordinary samples 
of water, etc. To know what water is in this less demanding everyday sense of “knowing 
what” does not require one to know the essence of water, i.e. know that water is H2O. 
 
3. The Formulation 
What Lewis calls “the Identification Thesis” is just the thesis of revelation (see Stoljar, 
2006, 2009). As we have just seen, Lewis formulates the thesis of revelation as the 
following: 
 
[W]hen I have an experience-token with quale Q, the knowledge I thereby gain reveals the essence 
of Q: a property of Q such that, necessarily, Q has it and nothing else does. (Lewis, 1995: 142) 
 
 There are two things to notice in Lewis’ formulation of the thesis of revelation. First, 
Lewis is adopting a modal account of essential properties and of essence, according to 
which an essential property of a thing is just a necessary property of that thing, and the 
essence of a thing is a property that is both necessary and sufficient for being that thing. 
One might not want to commit to this simple modal account of essence given its well-
known problems, discussed by Kit Fine (1994). Fine (ibid.: 4-5) provides several 
counterexamples to the modal account.  For instance, Socrates has the necessary property 
of belonging to the singleton set that has Socrates as its only member, i.e. {Socrates}. But 
intuitively, it is not part of the essence of Socrates, that is, it is not an essential property 
of Socrates, that he belongs to the singleton set {Socrates}. Fine, for his part, opts for the 
real definitional account of essence, which can be traced back to Aristotle and 
characterizes the notion of essence on the model of definition. According to this account, 
“the notion of definition has application to both words and objects – … just as we may 
define a word, or say what it means, so we may define an object, or say what it is” (Fine, 
ibid.: 2). Here, in cashing out the thesis of revelation, we can simply take the notion of 
essence in the intuitive Aristotelian/Finean sense, conceived on the model of definition.3 
 
The second thing to notice in Lewis’ formulation of the thesis of revelation is that, on the 
face of it, the essence of Q, according to Lewis, is a second-order property. The notion of 
qualia here is equivalent to the notion of phenomenal qualities or phenomenal properties. 
The essence of Q is then a property of a property. To know exactly what Q is, for Lewis, 
is to know that phenomenal property Q has the (second-order) property X where X is the 
essence of Q (that is, Q has X and nothing else does). 
 
Without resorting to talk of second-order properties, I propose to understand “knowing 
exactly what a quale is,” i.e. knowing the essence of a quale, as knowing some truth.4 
(This makes the task of formulating the thesis of revelation simpler, and is in fact what 
Lewis goes on to say.5) We can say that one knows exactly what P is if and only if one 
knows that “P is thus and so” where “thus and so” defines P, that is, captures the essence 
of P. For instance, one knows exactly what the property being triangular is if and only if 
one knows a truth that captures what the property (by definition and essentially) is, e.g. 
“Being triangular is having a three-sided closed shape.” The whole proposition is a 
definition of the property being triangular, stating what it is to be triangular. The 
predicate “having a three-sided closed shape” captures the essence of triangularity. In the 
 same way, knowing exactly what quale Q is amounts to knowing the truth “Q is X,” where 
“X” is a predicate that captures Q’s essence. The thesis of revelation says that one is in a 
position to know this truth about Q merely on the basis of having an experience with quale 
Q. 
 
However, in the case of a quale, if the thesis of revelation is true, one might think that the 
truth “Q is X” is hard to put into words. It seems that with many experiences, we find 
ourselves devoid of words to describe the qualia or the phenomenal characters of these 
experiences. Let us call the characteristic quale (phenomenal property) of experiences of 
red things, “phenomenal redness.” If, as I have or recall, an experience with that quale, I 
attempt to define what the quale phenomenal redness is, it might seem that all I am able 
to say is that “It is that,” using a demonstrative to refer to the phenomenal character of 
the phenomenal redness experience. But intuitively, the demonstrative “that” is merely a 
placeholder for the rich understanding of phenomenal redness I have which I am unable 
to put into words. The fact that I cannot put my understanding into words does not mean 
that I don’t know exactly what phenomenal redness is. 
 
Given our discussion, we can sharpen Lewis’ idea of revelation and formulate the thesis 
in the following way: 
 
 (Revelation) 
By having an experience-token with phenomenal property Q, one is in a 
position to know a truth, namely, “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” 
captures the essence of Q, although it may be hard to put into words.6 
 
Several things are worth pointing out with respect to the above formulation of revelation. 
First, the knowledge we have with respect to quale Q is a kind of knowledge-that or 
knowledge de dicto. The dictum is “Q is X.” More needs to be said about this knowledge 
de dicto. I will discuss this in the next section. Second, the knowledge de dicto “Q is X” 
is not just any truth about Q; it is a statement about what makes Q the property it is – the 
predicate “X” captures the essence of Q. More needs to be said about the notion of 
“capture” at issue. I will address this in section 5 when discussing Lewis’ argument from 
the thesis of revelation to the simplicity of qualia. Third, the relevant knowledge about 
the essence of Q is obtained under a certain circumstance, namely, by having the 
 experience. The knowledge at issue is made available in virtue of undergoing the 
experience alone. Fourth, the thesis of revelation does not imply that whenever one 
undergoes an experience with quale Q, one automatically knows the essence of Q; it only 
implies that one is in a position to know the essence given that one is not distracted, is 
able to attend to the experience, etc. 
 
4. Knowledge De Dicto versus Knowledge De Re 
In the last section, we have seen that the thesis of revelation is about a kind of knowledge 
de dicto. This point is worth dwelling on. In this section, I shall clarify that the thesis of 
revelation is best understood as involving a knowledge-attribution de dicto regarding 
knowledge de dicto that a particular quale Q is X, where the predicate “X” captures the 
essence of Q. To aid our discussion, I appeal to the following two distinctions (see 
Broackes, 1986): 
 
(1) knowledge de dicto vs. knowledge de re 
(2) knowledge-attribution de dicto vs. knowledge-attribution de re7 
 
(1) is a distinction between different kinds of knowledge. Knowledge de dicto consists in 
a relation between the knower and a certain proposition, whereas knowledge de re 
consists in a relation between the knower and a thing (see Sosa, 1970: 883).8 (2) is a 
distinction between different types of reports of knowledge. Knowledge-attributions de 
re, but not knowledge-attributions de dicto, permit substitution of co-designating terms 
salva veritate (i.e. preserving the truth-value of the proposition). 
 
Given the two distinctions, one must not assume that knowledge de dicto is always 
reported with knowledge-attributions de dicto, or knowledge de re reported with 
knowledge-attributions de re. Which kind of knowledge-attribution to use often depends 
on the context in which the knowledge report is made, to whom the report is made, the 
purpose of the report, etc. If a thinker thinks about something, she thinks about it under 
some mode of presentation, e.g. thinks of Venus as Hesperus, or as Phosphorus. But a 
report of the thinker’s thinking might not specify that mode of presentation. In general, a 
knowledge-attribution de dicto specifies the mode of presentation of the subject’s 
knowledge, whereas a knowledge-attribution de re does not. As such, if we are interested 
 in the mode of presentation, we should report the knowledge at issue with an attribution 
de dicto. 
 
For instance, suppose Tom thinks of Hesperus as Hesperus and has knowledge de dicto 
that Hesperus appears in the evening sky. Suppose also that Tom does not think of 
Hesperus as Venus. In such a case, it would still be correct to report Tom’s knowledge in 
the following way: “Tom knows, of Venus, that it appears in the evening sky.”9 But this 
attribution de re does not specify the way Tom thinks about Venus and consequently is 
silent about whether or not Tom knows de dicto that Hesperus appears in the evening sky. 
It seems that Tom’s knowledge is best reported in the de dicto way – “best reported” in 
the sense that the report is as accurate and complete a guide as possible with respect to 
the knowledge at issue, with respect to the way in which Tom thinks about Venus 
(Broackes, 1986: 375).  
 
With the two distinctions above, let us return to the topic of revelation. The thesis of 
revelation says that by having an experience with quale Q, one is in a position to know a 
truth or a dictum, namely, “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q. 
It seems that this knowledge de dicto is accurately reported by a knowledge-attribution 
de dicto as below: 
 
(D) By having an experience with quale Q, S is in a position to know that Q is X, 
where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q. 
 
To report it with a knowledge-attribution de re fails to completely capture the kind of 
knowledge at issue. A knowledge-attribution de re in this case looks something like this: 
 
(R) By having an experience with quale Q, S is in a position to know of X, where 
the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q, that Q is it. 
 
Compare (R) with the de re report, “Tom knows of Venus that Hesperus is it.” Suppose 
Tom thinks of Venus as Phosphorus and knows de dicto that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In 
such a case, the de re report is true. But this does not imply that Tom knows de dicto that 
Hesperus is Venus. The de re report is compatible with Tom having no idea what Venus 
is. Equally, (R), while stating that S is in a position to know de re of X, that Q is it (where 
 the predicate “X” captures the essence of quale Q), does not imply that S is in a position 
to know de dicto that Q is X (where the predicate “X” captures the essence of quale Q). 
In general, one can have knowledge de re of the essence, E, of something, Φ, without 
knowing de dicto that Φ is E. Let’s agree that water is H2O, where the expression “H2O” 
captures the essence of water. Someone who has no knowledge of chemistry may still 
know de re of H2O – thought of as water – that water is it, although she does not know 
de dicto that water is H2O. Similarly, there could be cases of knowledge de re of X that 
Q is it without knowledge de dicto that Q is X. In such cases of knowledge de re, X is 
thought of under some mode of presentation but not as X. So, (R) is compatible, in a 
perfectly good sense, with S having no idea of what X is, and with S having no knowledge 
de dicto that Q is X. In section 6 where we cash out the incompatibility between revelation 
and physicalism, we will see that for a physicalist, “X,” which captures the essence of Q, 
is a physical/functional predicate, and while a physicalist can endorse (R), she cannot 
endorse (D). 
 
To sum up, revelation is not the claim that experience merely puts one in a position to 
know de re of X, under some mode of presentation – not necessarily as X – that Q is it 
(where the predicate “X” captures the essence of quale Q) (see Stoljar, 2009). Rather, 
revelation is the claim that experience puts one in a position to know de dicto that Q is X 
(where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q). This knowledge de dicto is best 
reported with a knowledge-attribution de dicto in the manner of (D). The knowledge de 
dicto that “Q is X” may not be such that it can readily be expressed in words, but it does 
involve a rich understanding of X, which is what Q essentially is.  
 
5. Revelation and the Simplicity of Qualia 
Another notion that is worth pausing on is the notion of capture in the formulation of the 
thesis of revelation which I have presented at the end of section 3. Recall the formulation: 
 
(Revelation) 
By having an experience-token with phenomenal property Q, one is in a 
position to know a truth, namely, “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” 
captures the essence of Q, although it may be hard to put into words. 
 
 The word “capture” has a number of meanings. “Capture” here should not be taken just 
to mean “refer to, latch onto.” It is meant to convey the idea of “representing accurately 
in words or pictures” as in “A vivid photograph captures the scene.”10 For instance, the 
truth “Being triangular is having a three-sided closed shape” captures or describes 
accurately what the property of being triangular is. Note that this truth describes the 
internal structure of the property of triangularity – having three sides and being closed. If 
a property P has an internal structure, assuming that a property’s structure is essential to 
that property, then a truth that captures the essence of property P must also describe the 
internal structure of P. If a truth that captures the essence of P does not describe P as 
having an internal structure, then P does not have an internal structure, i.e. it is simple. 
 
Recall that in our formulation of the thesis of revelation, the truth “Q is X” is supposed 
to describe Q’s essence. In cashing out revelation, we agreed that “X” might be difficult 
(even impossible) to put into words. In cases where Q seems indescribable, we might just 
say “this” (pointing inwardly to an experience of Q we have in mind). The intuition that 
at least in some cases we cannot say more about Q’s essence than “Q is this” arises from 
the fact that in these cases, in having an experience with quale Q, we do not seem to notice 
Q to have any structure. Given revelation and assuming again that a property’s structure 
is essential to that property, if quale Q had internal structure, then by having an experience 
with Q, one would be in a position to know that Q had that structure. The description of 
that structure would be given in stating that Q is X, where the predicate “X” captures the 
essence of quale Q.11 If there is no structure to notice with respect to Q, then Q has no 
structure, i.e. Q is simple. Indeed, in the following passage, Lewis remarks on the 
simplicity of qualia, which he takes to follow from the thesis of revelation: 
 
If we know exactly what the qualia of our experiences are, they can have no essential hidden 
structure – no ‘grain’ – of which we remain ignorant. (If we didn’t know whether their hidden ‘grain’ 
ran this way or that, we wouldn’t know exactly what they were. Whatever we might know about 
them, we would not fully know their essence.) But if nothing essential about the qualia is hidden, 
then if they seem simple, they are simple. We may assume that if a property is structural, then it is 
so essentially. Then it is a consequence of the Identification Thesis that if we fail to notice structure, 
there is no structure there to notice. But we do fail to notice structure. So the simplicity of the qualia 
is a consequence of the Identification Thesis (inter alia), and so a derivative part of the folk-
psychological concept of qualia. (Lewis, 1995: 142) 
 
 The above passage can be formulated into the following argument: 
 
(a) Structure is part of the essence of a property. 
(b) By having an experience-token with phenomenal property Q, one is in a 
position to know a truth, namely, “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” captures 
the essence of Q. 
(c) If Q has internal structure, then by having an experience with Q, one would 
be in a position to know that Q has internal structure. 
(d) There is at least a range of cases such that in having an experience with Q, 
one is not in a position to know that Q has internal structure. 
(e) Some qualia have no internal structure (i.e. they are simple). 
 
Premise (a) seems intuitive. If a property has a certain structure, it has it essentially – a 
property lacking that structure would not be the same property. (b) is the thesis of 
revelation. (c) follows from (a) and (b). (d) seems intuitively true – we just do not notice 
any structure in having experiences such as phenomenal redness, hearing middle C, etc. 
(Some other qualia do seem to have structural features, e.g. the quale of a certain complex 
visual experience.) Conclusion (e) then follows from (c) and (d). So for Lewis, the thesis 
of revelation also entails that (some) qualia are simple (see also Adams, 1987).  
 
6. Revelation and Physicalism 
Having clarified the thesis of revelation, in this section I turn to address the primary 
significance of revelation in the literature, namely, its incompatibility with physicalism. 
As already mentioned in section 1, how the incompatibility between revelation and 
physicalism is precisely understood depends on how the thesis of revelation and the 
doctrine of physicalism are respectively cashed out. We have formulated the thesis of 
revelation, but we have not clarified what physicalism precisely entails. While there is no 
uncontentious definition of physicalism (see Stoljar, 2010), most physicalists would agree 
that the phenomenal properties of conscious experiences are purely physical or functional 
– a physical/functional description exhausts the nature of qualia. So according to 
physicalism standardly conceived, the only truth that captures the essence of Q is some 
physical or functional truth, i.e. “Q is X,” where “X” is a physical or functional predicate, 
as in, for instance, “Phenomenal redness is R-fiber firing in the brain,” “Itchiness is 
functional role F (realized by physical properties P1, P2, P3, …),” etc. In cashing out the 
 incompatibility between revelation and physicalism, I will focus on standard versions of 
physicalism, namely, versions according to which qualia have physical or functional 
essences. 
 
The structure of this section is as follows. First, I address Lewis’ remarks on the matter. 
Then, I turn to consider role functionalist versions of physicalism. I shall argue that role 
functionalism is incompatible with revelation. Finally, I lay out a formulation of the 
incompatibility between the thesis of revelation and standard versions of physicalism. 
 
6.1. Lewis, Revelation and Physicalism 
Lewis (1995: 142) says that the thesis of revelation is part of the folk psychological 
concept of qualia and “seems obvious” (that is, intuitive). However, he rejects revelation 
because it is incompatible with physicalism, which he commits to. After spelling out the 
thesis of revelation, Lewis moves on to discuss why physicalists cannot accept revelation. 
He explains: 
 
If, for instance, Q is essentially the physical property of being an event of C-firing, and if I identify 
the qualia of my experience in the appropriate “demanding and literal” sense, I come to know that 
what is going on in me is an event of C-firing. Contrapositively: if I identify the quale of my 
experience in the appropriate sense, and yet know nothing of the firing of my neurons, then the quale 
of my experience cannot have been essentially the property of being an event of C-firing. 
 
A materialist cannot accept the Identification Thesis. If qualia are physical properties of experiences, 
and experiences in turn are physical events, then it is certain that we seldom, if ever, identify the 
qualia of our experiences. Making discoveries in neurophysiology is not so easy! (op. cit.) 
 
The idea here should be straightforward. Recall that for Lewis (1995: 142), the term 
“qualia” is “a name for the occupants of a certain functional role that is spelled out in our 
tacitly known folk psychology.” We have seen that Lewis allows that the thesis of 
revelation (his “identification thesis” – component (iv) in section 2) describes one 
component of the qualia-role. Let Q be the phenomenal property of a pain-experience (its 
painfulness), and let X be Q’s essence and the predicate “X” capture Q’s essence. 
Physicalists like Lewis take X to be a physical property that plays the functional role of 
quale Q. So “X” is a physical predicate, e.g. “being an event of C-fibers firing.” But if the 
functional role of qualia includes the thesis of revelation – that is, includes our being in a 
 position to know the essences of qualia simply by being the subject of experiences that 
have the qualia among their properties – then we will not be able to find any physical 
properties that fulfil the role. In having an experience with quale Q, there is no physical 
property X such that just by having the experience alone, one can know the truth “Q is 
X,” where “X” is a physical predicate that captures the essence of Q. In having a pain-
experience, I am certainly not in a position to know de dicto that the painfulness of my 
experience of pain is its being an event of C-fibers firing. What this means is that no 
physical property can play the full qualia-role, because no physical property can play the 
revelation component of the qualia-role. 
 
As a result, Lewis drops the thesis of revelation from the full-blown functional definition 
of qualia which we saw in the beginning of section 2. What remains then are components 
(i), (ii) and (iii). 
 
(i) Qualia cause our “abilities to recognize and to imagine experiences of the 
same type”; 
(ii) Qualia are “responsible for responses of pleasure, disgust, etc.”; 
(iii) Qualia are “responsible for judgements of similarity-distance, e.g., the 
judgement that these two colour-samples nearly match whereas those two 
contrast strikingly.” 
 
These remaining components constitute the nearest functional role which some physical 
properties can indeed satisfy. So, to the question “Should a materialist believe in qualia?” 
Lewis responds: 
 
Yes: he should believe in imperfect but good-enough deservers of the name, occupants of the part of the 
folk-psychological role we get by leaving out the Identification Thesis [i.e. revelation]. And no: he should 
not believe in perfect deservers of the name, occupants of the entire role. (Lewis, ibid.: 142-3)  
 
As a physicalist, Lewis denies that there is anything that perfectly satisfies our folk-
psychological conception of qualia. But he proposes that physical properties of physical 
events (such as the property of being an event of C-fibers firing) can deserve – imperfectly, 
but well enough – the name “qualia.” 
 
 6.2. Revelation and Functionalism 
As we saw, Lewis is a functionalist who takes qualia to be occupants of functional roles 
spelt out in folk psychology. As we also saw, Lewis subscribes to what is known as “the 
identity theory,” according to which qualia are just physical properties such as being an 
event of C-fibers firing. Lewis is thus a realizer functionalist, who identifies qualia with 
physical properties that realize the corresponding functional roles (see also Lewis, 
1966).12 Realizer functionalism is distinguished from role functionalism, which identifies 
qualia with functional role properties that may be multiply realized by different physical 
properties playing the same functional role (e.g. in differently constituted creatures). In 
our discussion on Lewis, we saw that revelation is incompatible with realizer functionalist 
physicalism and the claim that qualia have physical essences. More needs to be said about 
whether revelation is incompatible with role functionalist physicalism and the claim that 
qualia have functional essences.13 In the remainder of this section, by “functionalism,” I 
simply mean role functionalism.  
 
Note that different versions of functionalism cash out the notion of a functional role 
differently. According to scientific functionalism or psychofunctionalism, in the 
terminology of Block (1978), functional roles are cashed out in the vocabulary of 
cognitive science or neuroscience. According to what is known as “commonsense 
functionalism,” functional roles are cashed out in the non-technical, everyday vocabulary 
of commonsense psychology. It is straightforward that revelation is incompatible with 
psychofunctionalism. In having an experience with a particular quale Q, there is no 
functional property X cashed out in technical, scientific vocabulary such that just by 
having the experience alone, one can know that Q is X. It is not so straightforward that 
the thesis of revelation is incompatible with commonsense functionalism. All else equal, 
being in a position to know a piece of everyday commonsense seems more likely than 
being in a positon to know something technical and scientific.  
 
A commonsense functionalist would say that “X” is a functional predicate couched in the 
non-technical vocabulary of commonsense psychology. She might also insist that one is 
indeed in a position to know such a functional truth “Q is X” by having an experience 
with quale Q.14 However, I shall argue that revelation is incompatible with commonsense 
functionalism.15 
 
 In cashing out the thesis of revelation, we mentioned the idea that the essence-capturing 
truth “Q is X” may be hard to put into words. This is supposed to capture the intuitive 
idea that phenomenal experiences have indescribable phenomenology. 16  Now 
commonsense functionalists claim that qualia can be fully defined by their functional 
roles. One might think that intuitively, such functional roles do not seem to capture the 
“je ne sais quoi (I know not what)” character of qualia.17 But if the essence of a quale is 
functional (or physical), then it can be put into words. Commonsense functionalists would 
of course deny that any qualia are indescribable and insist that if one states the full 
functional role of a quale in the everyday vocabulary of commonsense psychology, then 
one has successfully given a definition of what that quale is essentially. In spelling out 
the incompatibility between revelation and commonsense functionalism, I shall grant that 
the thesis of revelation does not entail, but merely allows, that the essence-capturing truth 
“Q is X” is hard to put into words.18 I shall also set aside the general concern that, 
intuitively, a state’s having a certain functional role does not guarantee that the state have 
any phenomenology at all.  
 
In order to satisfy the thesis of revelation, the commonsense functionalist would have to 
say that by having a pain experience with phenomenal property Q (where Q is the 
painfulness of pain), a subject is in a position to know the commonsense functional role 
of Q. That is, the subject is in a position to achieve de dicto knowledge of the form “Q is 
X,” where “X” specifies the commonsense functional role of painfulness, which captures 
the essence of painfulness. I shall argue that in having a pain experience with phenomenal 
property Q, one is not in a position to know the commonsense functional role of Q; one 
is not in a position to know de dicto such a truth “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” 
captures the essence of Q in commonsense psychological terms.  
 
Commonsense functionalists define qualia in terms of their functional roles by drawing 
on what is common knowledge about mental states with these qualia (Braddon-Mitchell 
and Jackson, 2007: 52). According to these functionalists, this common knowledge has 
three parts: “there are input clauses – clauses that say what sorts of events cause mental 
states in people; output clauses – clauses that say what sort of behaviours are caused by 
mental states; and internal role clauses – clauses that describe the internal interactions of 
mental states” (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, ibid.: 48). The input clauses for quale pain 
would include the clause “bodily damage causes experiences with quale pain”; output 
 clauses would include the clause “experiences with quale pain cause bodily movements 
that relieve pain and minimize damage”; internal clauses would plausibly include the 
clause “experiences with quale pain cause desires to relieve pain, which typically lead to 
desires to take painkillers (if one also believes that taking painkillers would be likely to 
relieve the pain)” (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, ibid., 52-3). Giving a definition of what 
quale pain is in commonsense functional terms requires specifying all three kinds of 
clauses. 
 
As we saw in section 3, according to the thesis of revelation, the knowledge de dicto that 
Q is X, where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q, is gained in virtue of having 
the experience alone. Let us agree that one is in a position to know the tripartite 
commonsense functional role of quale pain. Still, it seems implausible that it is in virtue 
of having a pain experience alone, that one is in a position to have such knowledge, which, 
according to commonsense functionalists, captures the essence of quale pain. Consider, 
first, the internal clauses which say that the painfulness of pain causes a desire to relieve 
pain and motivation toward actions that the subject believes would make the painfulness 
of pain more likely to stop. The details of such actions and motivations (to take painkillers, 
for example), are unlikely to be known just in virtue of having a painful experience. If 
“causing the desire to take painkillers” is built into the internal clauses that specify part 
of the functional role of quale pain, then the functional role will not be revelation 
compatible, as we shall say. It is just not true that in virtue of having a pain experience 
alone, one is in a position to know that quale pain is X where the predicate “X” includes 
“painkillers.” Of course, the commonsense functionalist has a ready response to this point. 
They should say that what is core and primary in the internal clauses of the functional 
role of quale pain is nothing specifically about painkillers, but just that the painfulness of 
pain causes the desire that it stop.  
 
Consider, second, the input clauses of the functional role of quale pain which say that 
bodily damage causes experiences with quale pain. It does not seem to be the case that in 
virtue of having a pain experience, that is, in virtue of feeling pain, I am in a position to 
know that it is bodily damage that causes my experience to have a particular phenomenal 
character. Nothing about bodily damage is revealed to one in having pain experiences like 
headaches, stomachaches, cramps etc. Even in cases where one feels pain in one’s finger 
as a result of its being cut, having the sensation of pain in one’s finger does not on its own 
 reveal that one has a cut on one’s finger which gives rise to the sensation. According to 
proponents of commonsense functionalism, the input clauses that form part of the 
definition of quale pain explicitly mention “bodily damage” (Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson, ibid.: 52). But a functional role with such input clauses will not be revelation 
compatible. In having the phenomenal experience of pain alone, one is not typically in a 
position to know that quale pain is X where the predicate “X” includes “bodily damage.” 
 
Now, we can grant that there are commonsense clauses about quale pain that one is in a 
position to know in virtue of having a painful experience, including the output clause “the 
experience with quale pain causes one to wince, to have reflexive movements of 
avoidance or withdrawal,” the internal clause “the experience with quale pain causes one 
to want the experience to stop,” and perhaps others. But it is far from obvious that the 
clauses of this reduced, revelation-compatible functional role specification are adequate 
to capture the essence of quale pain. Specifically, these functional role clauses might not 
distinguish the painfulness of pain from other qualia. For example, the phenomenal 
properties of experiences such as biting into a slice of lemon, seeing something extremely 
bright, hearing a loud fire alarm going off, etc. all typically cause one to wince and to 
have reflexive movements of avoidance or withdrawal. In all these cases, the subject also 
typically desires the relevant experience to stop. But while these experiences are examples 
of distress, they are typically not considered as experiences of pain – one would not 
usually say that one is in pain if one has one of these experiences.  
 
The claim that commonsense role functionalism is compatible with the thesis of 
revelation clearly faces a dilemma. If a functional role specification is to capture the 
essence of quale pain, then it must individuate quale pain, in the sense that no other quale 
has that functional role. A functional role specification that includes enough of what is 
commonly known about the role of pain to meet this individuation requirement is 
plausibly not revelation compatible. And a functional role specification that is sufficiently 
reduced to be revelation compatible is plausibly no longer individuative. This pattern 
certainly generalizes beyond the example of the painfulness of pain. 
 
Consider how a commonsense functionalist would spell out the functional roles of the 
phenomenal properties of various color experiences. In his paper “Naming the Colours,” 
 Lewis (1997) mentions the following two clauses as being central to the commonsense 
functional roles of worldly colors and corresponding properties of color experiences: 
 
D1   Red is the surface property of things which typically causes experience of red 
in people who have such things before their eyes.  
D2   Experience of red is the inner state of people which is the typical effect of 
having red things before the eyes. (Lewis, ibid.: 327)  
 
D1 and D2 inter-define red and experience of red. But exactly similar clauses inter-define 
green and experience of green. So the putative functional role of the pair <red, experience 
of red> does not individuate that pair. The pair <red, experience of red> is very far from 
being the only pair <X, Y> such that X is the surface property of things which typically 
causes Y in people who have such things before their eyes and Y is the inner state of people 
which is the typical effect of having X things before the eyes. 
 
In order to break out of the circle of inter-definition and distinguish experience of red 
from other colour experiences, D2, which is the input clause for experience of red, needs 
to be augmented with something about common examples of worldly surfaces that are 
red, and so (according to D1) cause experience of red. But it seems that having an 
experience of red does not, by itself, put the subject in a position to know about such 
examples. For instance, one might define experience of red as being “typically caused by 
the color of a British pillar box” (Lewis, ibid.: 335). But surely, in having an experience 
of red alone, one is not in a position to know anything about British pillar boxes nor in a 
position to know that phenomenal redness is typically caused by seeing a British pillar 
box.19 
 
This second example helps to sharpen the dilemma facing commonsense functionalists 
who claim that their position is compatible with the thesis of revelation. If commonsense 
functionalists define qualia in functional terms by appealing to everyday concepts of 
worldly objects and states like “painkillers” or “bodily damage” in the case of quale pain 
and “British pillar box” in the case of phenomenal redness, then commonsense 
functionalism is incompatible with revelation. But if commonsense functionalists avoid 
making references to these things in spelling out the commonsense functional roles of 
qualia, then it seems no longer clear that, with only the vocabulary that would not create 
 a problem for maintaining revelation, they can give adequate functional definitions that 
individuate qualia. It does not seem that the reduced functional definition of a given quale 
Q, which the subject is in a position to know by having an experience with quale Q, is 
fine-grained enough to distinguish Q from other qualia.20  
 
Given this dilemma, our conclusion must be that commonsense role functionalism – like 
realizer functionalism (and the identity theory) and scientific role functionalism 
(psychofunctionalism) – is incompatible with the thesis of revelation. 
 
6.3. The Argument from Revelation against Physicalism 
At this point, it would be useful to formally lay out the incompatibility between the thesis 
of revelation and physicalism. Here I will present the incompatibility between the two in 
the format of an argument, namely, an argument from the thesis of revelation to the falsity 
of physicalism. (Here physicalism is understood as entailing the claim that qualia have 
physical or functional essences. If there are positions that do not entail this claim, but are 
nonetheless worthy of the name “physicalism,” then whether those versions of 
physicalism are incompatible with revelation is a separate question.21) 
 
(1) If S has an experience-token with quale Q, then S is in a position to know de 
dicto that “Q is X,” where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q. 
(2) If physicalism is true, then qualia have physical/functional essences. 
(3) If qualia have physical/functional essences, then by having an experience-
token with quale Q, S should be in a position to know de dicto that “Q is X,” 
where “X” is a physical/functional predicate which captures the essence of Q. 
(4) It is not true that by having an experience-token with quale Q, S is in a 
position to know de dicto that “Q is X,” where “X” is a physical/functional 
predicate which captures the essence of Q.  
(5) Physicalism is false. 
 
Premise (1) is entailed by the thesis of revelation. (2) states what the essences of qualia 
would be if physicalism were true. (3) follows from (1) and (2). (4) is supported by the 
considerations discussed in sections 6.1 and 6.2. (5) then concludes from (3) and (4) that 
physicalism is false. 
 
 Given our clarification of the distinction between knowledge de dicto and knowledge de 
re of qualia in section 4, it is worth noting that physicalists, in denying revelation, can 
still say that by having an experience with quale Q, one is in a position to know de re of 
X, where the predicate “X” captures the essence of Q, that Q is it (see Lewis, 1995: 143). 
A physicalist might say that there are two distinct modes of presentation of the essence 
of the phenomenal property Q – a physical/functional mode of presentation and a 
phenomenal mode of presentation, and that the mode of presentation that reveals the 
essence of Q is the physical/functional one (see Loar, 1997: 603). So “X,” which captures 
the essence of Q, is a physical/functional predicate. Such a physicalist can say that by 
having an experience with quale Q, one is in a position to know de re of 
physical/functional property X (but under its phenomenal mode of presentation) that Q is 
it, e.g. know de re of the property of being an event of C-fibers firing that the painfulness 
of a pain experience is that property.22 This is analogous to the case of Tom’s knowledge 
of Venus. Suppose again that Tom thinks of Venus as Phosphorus and not as Venus and 
that Tom knows de dicto that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In such a case, we can still say that 
“Tom knows of Venus that Hesperus is it.” Tom has knowledge de re of Venus (even 
without any idea what Venus is) insofar as he thinks of Venus as Phosphorus. 
 
One can also see that the doctrine of the simplicity of qualia, which we discussed in 
section 5, is in tension with physicalism. If qualia are physical or functional properties, 
which are presumably not simple, then qualia cannot be simple. Hence, physicalists also 
ought to reject the idea that qualia are simple (see Lewis, 1995: 142). In section 5, we saw 
that there is an argument from revelation to the conclusion that some qualia are simple. 
The argument crucially relies on the premise that there is at least a range of cases such 
that in having an experience with Q, one is not in a position to know that Q has internal 
structure. A commonsense functionalist who claims their position to be compatible with 
revelation is likely to reject this premise and claim that in all cases, by having an 
experience with Q, one is indeed in a position to know the complex structure of Q as a 
result of being in a position to know the complex commonsense functional role of Q.23 
This allows such a commonsense functionalist to reject the entailment from the thesis of 
revelation to the claim that some qualia are simple. But as we saw, it is unclear that 
commonsense functionalism is compatible with revelation in the first place.  
 
 7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have offered a detailed discussion on the thesis of revelation and its 
incompatibility with physicalism. Much of our discussion focused on Lewis’ remarks on 
revelation. Despite Lewis’ illuminating discussion in his 1995 paper, it is only more 
recently that the thesis of revelation has been brought up explicitly in relation to the 
discussion on whether physicalism is true (see Stoljar, 2006, 2009; Majeed, 2017; 
Trogdon, 2017; Goff, 2017).24 But in the literature, as already mentioned, revelation and 
physicalism are not always thought to be incompatible (see Damnjanovic, 2012; Stoljar, 
2018). Of course, the issue here depends on how one cashes out the thesis of revelation 
and how one formulates physicalism. We have just seen that the thesis of revelation, as 
we have formulated it here, is indeed incompatible with standard versions of physicalism, 
which take qualia to have physical/functional essences. 
 
Whether the argument from revelation against physicalism is compelling depends, of 
course, on whether the thesis of revelation itself is compelling, an issue that we have not 
touched on in this paper. At the beginning of the paper, I mentioned that revelation is 
often thought of as intuitive, even by avowed physicalists. But the claim that revelation 
is intuitive is not without contention (see Stoljar, 2009). Whether revelation is intuitive, 
and in what sense it is intuitive if it is, are issues that await further discussion. I am 
inclined to think that revelation is intuitive in the sense that it is part of our ordinary 
conception of experience, and that this is evident from the way we talk about 
experiences.25 Even if revelation turns out to be an intuitive claim, whether it is in fact 
true is a separate question. There are few direct arguments against revelation in the 
literature.26 Physicalists like Lewis, who acknowledge the intuitiveness of revelation, end 
up denying it simply because of its incompatibility with physicalism. Further discussion 
on the plausibility of revelation is thus called for.27  
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2 Of course, any experience-token belongs to many experience-types, of varying degrees of specificity. 
When we talk about experience-tokens of the same experience-type, we rely on context to indicate the 
relevant degree of specificity. 
 
3 Revelation is about knowing the essence of phenomenal properties. Although in his original paper Fine 
was mainly concerned with individual-essence, one can extend the Finean conception of essence to apply 
to type-essence. 
 
4 Here knowledge-what is understood as a kind of knowledge-that. This is the orthodox approach to 
knowledge-what in the literature (see Stanley and Williamson, 2001). Knowing what x is at least involves 
knowing a proposition which is the answer to the question “What is x?” 
 
5 Immediately after the passage quoted above, Lewis writes: 
 
If, for instance, Q is essentially the physical property of being an event of C-firing, and 
if I identify the qualia of my experience in the appropriate ‘demanding and literal’ sense, 
I come to know that what is going on in me is an event of C-firing. Contrapositively: if I 
identify the quale of my experience in the appropriate sense, and yet know nothing of the 
firing of my neurons, then the quale of my experience cannot have been essentially the 
property of being an event of C-firing. (Lewis, 1995: 142) 
 
Note that being an event of C-firing is, strictly speaking, not a property of the quale Q which is the 
qualitative character of pain-experience, i.e. quale pain. The property being an event of C-firing is more 
appropriately understood as a property of pain-experience-token itself.  
 
6 On some accounts, our rich understanding of phenomenal properties is embodied in a demonstrative-like, 
or recognition-based, phenomenal concept (e.g. Chalmers, 2010). The thesis of revelation, in recent 
literature, has been formulated via the notion of phenomenal concepts (see Goff, 2015, 2017; Trogdon, 
2017). The present formulation does not depend on the notion of phenomenal concepts and captures the 
intuitive idea behind the thesis.  
 
7 The same distinctions apply to other propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, etc. 
 
8 Knowledge de dicto and knowledge de re are not mutually exclusive. For instance, I know that the sun 
will rise tomorrow. I not only have knowledge with respect to a dictum, namely, “The sun will rise 
tomorrow,” I also have knowledge with respect to a res, namely, the sun. 
 
9 In having knowledge de dicto that “Hesperus appears in the evening sky,” Tom also has knowledge de re 
of Hesperus/Venus. Such knowledge de re can also be reported with a knowledge-attribution de dicto – in 
this case, namely, “Tom knows that Hesperus appears in the evening sky.” 
 
10 According to Brian Loar (1997), the word “capture” is ambiguous. Loar (ibid.: 603) points out two 
different senses in saying that “a concept captures the essence of the referent.” He writes:  
 
These are equivocating uses of “capture the essence of.” On one use, it expresses a 
referential notion that comes to no more than “directly rigidly designate.” On the other, 
it means something like “be conceptually interderivable with some theoretical predicate 
that reveals the internal structure of” the designated property. But the first does not imply 
the second. (op. cit.) 
 
For Loar, who is an a posteriori physicalist, a phenomenal concept can be said to capture the essence of the 
phenomenal property in the sense that it directly refers to the referent, but it does not tell us anything about 
the nature of the referent. This is not how I have intended to use the term “capture.” On the other hand, a 
physicalist like Loar would say that a physical concept captures the essence of the phenomenal property, 
in the sense that it tells us what the property really is in a way that reveals the nature of the property. This 
is the sense of “capture” at issue here. The thesis of revelation says that the truth “Q is X,” which one knows 
through having an experience of the type Q and which is hard to put into words, is a truth that captures, in 
this second sense, the essence of Q.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
11  It seems that whenever we notice our phenomenology to have structures, we can describe the 
phenomenology, including its internal structure, to some extent which goes beyond using a mere 
demonstrative “this.” We might say things like: “There is a bit of phenomenal redness on the left of my 
visual field. Next to it, there is some phenomenal blueness, etc.” From this, it does not follow that a complex, 
structured experience can be fully captured in a verbal description. The simple constituent phenomenal 
properties will likely not be captured in words without resorting to demonstratives and/or metaphors.  
 
12 Lewis is also an a priori physicalist, who holds the view that the conditional “If P then Q,” where P stands 
for the totality of physical truths and Q stands for a given phenomenal truth, is true a priori. One can also 
be an a posteriori physicalist and hold the view that “If P then Q” is only true a posteriori. Many proponents 
of a posteriori physicalism explicitly reject revelation (see Loar, 1997; McLaughlin, 2001, 2003; Papineau, 
2007; Balog, 2012). Like Lewis, they reject it simply because it renders physicalism false. 
 
13 Both identity theorists and realiser functionalists would agree that phenomenal properties have physical 
essences. In contrast, role functionalists take phenomenal properties to have functional essences.  
 
14 I am indebted to Frank Jackson for pressing me on this issue. 
 
15 There are problems with commonsense functionalism that are independent of the thesis of revelation (see 
Block, 1978).  
 
16 The idea that qualia are indescribable can be traced to Descartes, who thinks that sensations have an “I-
know-not-what” (“je ne sais quelle” in French) aspect (see Cottingham, 2012). For a recent discussion on 
the indescribable character of experience, see Camp (2006).  
 
17 This, I think, points to the common objection against functionalism, that knowing what the functional 
role of pain is does not seem to amount to knowing what pain feels like, and the essence of the painfulness 
of pain does not seem to be exhausted by its functional role. 
 
18 The idea that mere words are unable to communicate the essence of phenomenal property Q is not 
officially part of the thesis of revelation. In cashing out revelation, I merely left open the possibility that 
the essence-capturing truth “Q is X” may be hard to put into words. As we have seen, the reason that the 
identity theory or realizer-functionalist physicalism is incompatible with the thesis of revelation is not that 
revelation requires the essences of qualia to be indescribable – it does not explicitly require that.  
 
19 It is interesting to note that in his paper “Naming the Colours,” Lewis (1997: 338-9) discusses the idea 
that adding revelation to the functional definition of colour experience would help individuate experience 
of red and distinguish it from other colour experiences. However, he rejects this approach because he takes 
revelation to be false by materialistic lights.  
 
20 Block (1978: 300) raises a similar worry that common knowledge can fail to distinguish two sensations 
that feel different.  
 
21 For instance, one might argue that physicalism defined as a grounding thesis does not entail that qualia 
have physical/functional essences (see Stoljar, 2018). Whether revelation is incompatible with grounding 
physicalism, i.e. physicalism cashed out as a grounding thesis, requires separate treatment. 
 
22 A physicalist can say that the essence of Q, which is a physical/functional property, can be thought about 
in a physical/functional way, i.e. as X, or in a phenomenal way, as, say, Y. Such a physicalist can say that 
by having an experience with quale Q, one is in a position to know de dicto that Q is Y. Note that “Y,” 
which is a phenomenal predicate, refers to but does not capture the essence of Q.  
 
23  Note that such a commonsense functionalist operates on a broad conception of qualia where the 
functional roles of qualia form at least part of their essences. One might say that on a narrow conception of 
qualia which treats functional roles as being separate from the essences of qualia, we do not notice some 
qualia to have structures in having the relevant experiences.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
24 One does find something similar to the thesis of revelation being used as an objection against the 
phenomenal concept strategy (see Levine, 2001: 84; Nida-Rümelin, 2007; Goff, 2011, 2015). This is the 
worry that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot account for the idea that phenomenal concepts afford 
us substantive knowledge about the nature of phenomenal properties. For replies to this challenge from 
a posteriori physicalists, see Schroer (2010), Díaz-León (2014), Elpidorou (2016), and Taylor (2018). 
 
25 In an unpublished paper, I put forward an argument for the intuitiveness of revelation which takes the 
form of an inference to the best explanation. I contend that sentences such as “I know what pain feels like, 
but I don’t know what the feeling of pain really is” are odd, and such oddity is best explained by the 
hypothesis that the thesis of revelation is part of our ordinary conception of experience. Given this inference 
to the best explanation, revelation is part of our ordinary conception of experience and is thus intuitive. 
 
26 Recently, Stoljar (2018) in his review of Goff’s book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, has raised 
an argument against the thesis of revelation. I am not aware of any other such arguments. 
 
27 I am very grateful to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Bill Child and especially Martin Davies for their 
helpful comments on drafts of this paper. 
